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The Automobile Manufacturer's Liability
to Pedestrians for Exterior Design:
New Dimensions in "Crashworthiness"
[O]ne in every twenty-five new cars will, before being retired
from use, become involved in an injury producing collision
with a pedestrian.t
Each year approximately twenty per cent of all traffic fatalities
in the United States are pedestrians.1 Of the 54,700 people killed
in traffic accidents in 1971, 10,600 were pedestrians.2 Cyclists made
up another 850 fatalities. 3 In addition to the over I 1,000 pedestrians
and cyclists killed, an estimated 150,000 pedestrians were injured
in 1971.4 This Note concerns the liability of automobile manufacturers for injuries caused by the exterior design of their products.
The plaintiffs in most cases will be pedestrians, but exterior design
defects may also injure motorcyclists, bicyclists, and, more rarely,
occupants of other vehicles.I' For convenience, the term "pedestrian"
will be used here to refer to all these possible plaintiffs.
Although the best solution to the problem of pedestrian injuries
may be the complete segregation of pedestrians from automobile
traffic, this is not presently feasible. 6 A presently feasible solution is
the reduction of the injury-inflicting potential of vehicle exteriors,
that is, making them more crashworthy. The term "crashworthy" is
often used narrowly to describe the success with which a vehicle

t Severy, Vehicle Exterior Safety, in 1970 INTERNATIONAL AUTOMOBILE SAFETY CoNFERENCE COMPENDIUM 1195, 1207.
1. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 46 (1972).
2. Id. at 45.
3. Id. at 47.
4. Id.at 45.
5. An Illinois case, Mieher v. Brown, 3 Ill. App. 3d 802, 278 N.E.2d 869 (1972), may
have opened the door to suits by occupants of a vehicle against the manufacturer of the
vehicle with which they collide. In that case decedent's automobile collided with the
rear end of a large truck. The front of the decedent's car passed underneath the rear
deck of the truck so that the deck went through the car's windshield and killed the
decedent. Her representative alleged that the truck manufacturer had negligently designed the truck because it had failed "to attach a reasonably safe rear bumper, fender
or similar shield." 3 Ill. App. 3d at 805, 278 N.E.2d at 871. On an appeal from a judgment of dismissal, the Illinois court held that the complainant's allegations of negligent design were sufficient to state a cause of action.
6. Severy, Vehicle Exterior Safety, in 1970 INTERNATIONAL AUTOMOBILE SAFETY CONFERENCE CoMPENDIUM 1195, 1196-97; O'Connell, Taming the Automobile, 58 Nw. U. L.
REv. 299, 332, 345 (1963).
[1654]
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structure protects its occupants during a collision.7 The term is
equally applicable to the protection of pedestrians hit during a
collision, although in this context it refers to exterior, rather than
interior, vehicle structure.
The requirement that a vehicle be crashworthy does not mean
that it must be made so safe that all pedestrian injuries and deaths
are eliminated. Automobile designs must take into account factors
other than the safety of the pedestrian, such as the safety of the
vehicle's occupants and the cost of the change in design, which may
eventually be passed on to the consumer. For example, in order to
protect the occupants in collisions involving other cars, an automobile must have a hard outer shell,8 but serious injury or death
is unavoidable when any vehicle so equipped collides with a pedestrian while traveling at a high speed.
Two aspects of current exterior design can, however, be made
safer without sacrificing other important interests. The first of these
is the presence of force-concentrating structures-small, sharp surfaces, such as chrome trim or hood ornaments-on the exposed surfaces of the automobile. 9 The danger that such structures pose £or
the pedestrian has been described very simply: "[I]t is fundamental
to the production of trauma that the more localized the area which
receives the force of a blow, the more severe is the injury produced."10 The force concentration of some designs is so severe that
"[t]he vehicle fenders of some models have split the pelvic girdle of
a pedestrian apart in a manner similar to the action of a butcher's
meat chopper."11 Further, many of these structures are located in
7. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 6, at 348-56; Note, Manufacturer's Liability for an
"Uncrashworthy" Automobile, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 444 (1967).
8. Severy, supra note 6, at 1206.
9. Witness the blade-like front fenders on full-sized Oldsmobiles and Buicks. Front
bumpers on many GM cars come to sharp points at both ends. And the protruding,
hostile snouts of all 1969 Pontiacs are as pronounced as they were on 1968 Pontiacs.
GM is not, of course, alone in refusing to eliminate hostile exterior projections.
The Ford Galaxie's blade-like front fenders are even higher than the GM cars.'
To the Mustang's sharp headlight eyebrows have been added for 1969 a pair of
jutting horizontal edges that come• to a point in the middle of the grille-and
American Motor's Javelin and AMX resemble the Mustang's style.••• The dictates of styling are the only reason for these protusions. Not reason enough.
Safety: The Reluctant Dragon, CONSUMER REPORTS, April 1969, at 182, 193. See also H.
HILLEBOE & G. LARIMORE, PREVENTATIVE MEDICINE: PRINCIPLES OF PREVENTION IN THE OcCURENCE AND PROGRESSION OF DISEASE 212-15 (1959); s. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
3 (1966); Severy, supra note 6, at 1205-06.
10. H. HILLEBOE & G. LARIMORE, supra note 9, at 213. See also Severy, supra note 6,
at 1206: "Removal of protruding structures (headlight visors, exaggerated W-shaped
front ends, rear fender fins, etc.) and elimination of sharp-edged trim and other force
concentrating designs will do much to reduce the trauma inflicted to a pedestrian when
impacted."
11. Severy, supra note 6, at 1206.
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the areas where impact with pedestrians most frequently occursfor instance, near the headlights12-so that the danger posed is
maximized. In most cases there is no functional need for these structures;13 they serve only to enhance the vehicle's appearance and
thereby attract customers.14
The second aspect of exterior design that may unnecessarily
threaten pedestrians is the geometry, or over-all shape, of the automobile's front end.15 The front-end geometry determines the direction in which the body of a pedestrian will be thrown after the
initial impact.16 Certain front ends, for instance, strike the pedestrian below his center of gravity and hurl him toward a second impact with the hood or windshield of the car. Others may ramp the
pedestrian, that is, rebound him away from the car toward the
pavement. Sometimes the pedestrian will be rebounded in such a
way that the vehicle will ride over him as he lies on the pavement.
Finally, certain front ends are so designed that the pedestrian is
deflected sideways, out of the path of the impacting vehicle; the
result may be to throw him into the path of another vehicle.17 No
definitive information is now available regarding which geometry
provides maximum protection for pedestrians,18 and more study of
the question is needed.
Ideally, automobile manufacturers would voluntarily incorporate
considerations of pedestrian safety into their exterior designs. Un12. H. HILI.EBOE
at 1206-08.
13. H. HILLEBOE

&

G. LARIMORE, supra note 9, at 213. See also Severy, supra note 6,

& G. LARIMORE, supra note 9, at 213. See also Nader, Automobile
Design: Evidence Catching up with the Law, 42 DENVER L. CENTER J. 32, 39-40 (1965).
14. See R. NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED 226 (1965); CONSUMER REPORTS, supra note

9, at 183. The 1969 Chrysler Newport has been cited as an example of a stylish and
relatively safe model. CONSUMER REPORTS, supra, at 183. In some experimental safety
cars, great attention has been paid to exterior design safety. See J. O'CONNELL & A.
MYERS, SAFETY LAsT 117 (1966). Fairchild-Hiller has built a safety car with consideration
to exterior design. It is described and illustrated in Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Ex-

ecutive Reorganization of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations Pursuant to S.
Res.186, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1201-03 (1966) [hereinafter Hearings on S. Res. 186]. The
designers believe that they sacrificed little, if anything, in the style of the car.
15. See Severy, supra note 6, at 1200; Hearings on S. Res. 186, supra note 14, at
1202-03.
16. See Severy, supra note 6, at 1200-05; Hearings on S. Res. 186, supra note 14, at
1202-03; Fairchild-Hiller Corp., Safety Car Program-Feasibility Study IV-22 (Report to
N.Y. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, Aug. 1966). See also REPORT ON THE SECOND INTERNA·
TIONAL TECHNICAL CONFERENCE ON ExPERIMENTAL SAFETY VEHICLES 2-11 (Natl. Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, 1971).
17. For an extensive discussion of these problems, see Severy, supra note 6, at 1200-05.
18. There are studies that show the various effects of different front-end designs
upon impact, but no study definitively establishes an optimum design for protection of
pedestrians. See id. at 1203-05.
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fortunately, in the past the manufacturers have not demonstrated
a willingness to make their designs as safe as is feasible on their own
initiative.10 The failure of the automotive industry to incorporate
new safety measures may be partially explained in terms of customer
demand. Restricting its designs to those that do not unnecessarily
endanger pedestrians might prevent a manufacturer from taking
advantage of certain buyer preferences, such as demands for fins and
for chrome protrusions.20
In addition, the development of a reasonably safe exterior design
itself entails some expense. The production cost of a safer model
may be substantially the same as that of a nonsafety oriented model;
in fact, the elimination of some force-concentrating features, such
as chrome ornamentation, may even decrease production costs. However, new costs will be incurred in running safety tests and developing the most safe design. Since the automobile industry is intensely
competitive, slight rises in prices due to these additional costs may
result in lost sales.21 Or, if prices remain stable, the manufacturer's
profit may be reduced. The recent rise in consumer interest in automobile safety may indicate that safety-oriented cars will now attract
more consumers and lead to higher sales, an incentive that may lead
manufacturers to change their past position. However, even though
at least one manufacturer has acknowledged that safety might sell,22
the voluntary assumption by automobile manufacturers of the extra
cost needed to develop safe exterior design seems unlikely. Even if
purchasers are now attracted to and willing to pay more for cars with
increased interior crashworthiness to protect themselves or their
families, they are not likely to be attracted to those with safer exterior designs, which are likely to benefit only strangers.
Automobile manufacturers have little incentive to adopt safer
exterior designs voluntarily, but the financial pressure created by
litigation with injured pedestrians may move them to act, if the
courts are willing to entertain such suits. However, some courts have
been reluctant to act in the area of automobile design because they
19. S. REP. No. 1301, supra note 9, at 2, 4; CONSUMER REPORTS, supra note 9, at 18283, Cf. R. NADER, supra note 14, at 226-27; J. O'CONNELL &: A. MYERS, supra note 14,
at 146-65.

20. See J. KEATS, THE INSOLENT CHARIOTS 62 (1958); R. NADER, supra note 14, at 21031; O'Connell,supra note 6, at 356-70.
21. Cf. O'Connell, supra note 6, at 357-58.
22. Id. at 363. For a time it was an industry maxim that "safety doesn't sell." S. REP.
No. 1301, supra note 9, at 2. See J. O'CoNNELL &: A. MYERS, supra note 14, at 3-23;
Moynihan, Epidemic on the Highways, REPORTER, April 30, 1959, at 16, 20.
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have viewed it as an area better left to the legislature.23 Since this
judicial reluctance was first expressed by the courts, Congress has
passed the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.24
Under the Act the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) 25 is charged with formulating and enforcing regulations
to ensure safer design of motor vehicles. Congress expressly stated,
however, that the NHTSA standards were not to supplant the common law. 26 This disavowal was so strong that at least two commentators have interpreted the congressional statement as an encouragement to the courts to act in this area. 27
Litigation can bring financial pressure to bear on automobile
manufacturers both directly-through litigation costs, settlements,
and damages-and indirectly-through publicity, which leads to
lost sales and more suits. Whether pedestrian suits against manufacturers are won or lost, the litigation and occasional settlement
costs can be quite high, 28 and, when plaintiffs are successful, damages will often be significant.29 While these expenses provide some
incentive,30 they may not in themselves be sufficient.31 Indeed, since
an attractive exterior is an important sales factor, 32 litigation costs
may be more than offset by sales to customers attracted by the
dangerous design.
23. See, e.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 824 (7th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1967); McClung v. Ford Motor Co., 333 F. Supp. 17, 120 (S.D. W.
Va. 1971), affd., 472 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3645 (U.S., June
11, 1973). See also Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 475, 95 N.E.2d 802, 805 (1950).
24. Pub. L. No. 89--563, 80 Stat. 718 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-431 (1970), as
amended, (Supp. II, 1972)).
25. The NHTSA was originally called the National Highway Safety Bureau. See 36
Fed. Reg. 430 (1971).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (1970).
27. Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55 CALIF. L. R.Ev.
645, 675-77 (1967). See H.R. REP. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1966).
28. In the mid-1960's, General Motors Corporation (GM) was engaged in a multitude
of suits involving various aspects of its Corvair model. R. NADER, supra note 14, at 3-41.
It has been estimated that its litigation costs during this period ran as high as 10,000
dollars per day. Cars on Trial, 215 THE EcoNoMIST 1281, 1281 (1965).
29. Because current exterior designs are so dangerous to unprotected outsiders, severe injury, and thus high damages, are likely. One pedestrian allegedly paralyzed by
the headlight eyebrows of a car traveling five to ten miles per hour has sued Chrysler
Corporation for 2 million dollars. Baker v. Thornburg, No. 129 512 (Super. Ct., San
Mateo County, Cal., July 23, 1973).
30. See Katz, Liability of Automobile Manufacturers for Unsafe Design of Passsenger
Cars, 69 HARv. L. R.Ev. 863 (1956); Comment, Liability for Negligent Automobile Design,
52 IOWA L. R.Ev. 951, 953 (1967); Casenote, 19 AM. u. L. R.Ev. 273, 282 (1970).
31. Nader & Page, supra note 27, at 664, 673.
32. See J. KEATS, supra note 20, at 62; R. NADER, supra note 14, at 210-31; O'Connell,
supra note 6, at 356-70.
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Suits against manufacturers can also cause considerable adverse
publicity,33 and, in an area of such popular concern as automobile
safety, consumer advocates may amplify the publicity by using court
cases as the basis for books and articles attacking manufacturers.84
This publicity may affect the economic situation of the automobile
industry in several ways.
First, adverse publicity may decrease the sales of a particular
model. There is one classic example of this-the rear-engine,
Chevrolet Corvair. A series of suits alleging that the rear suspension
of the Corvair had caused serious one-car accidents35 led Ralph
Nader and others to publicize the problem in works that caught the
public's attention.36 Corvair sales dropped,37 and the Corvair was
eventually discontinued. 38
Second, publicity may cause a "snowball" effect, inspiring other
plaintiffs to bring suits based on similar accidents,39 which will in
turn increase the direct economic pressures on the manufacturer
and provide a basis for further publicity.
Finally, public concern aroused by adverse publicity may bring
pressure to bear on Congress or the NHTSA to set specific standards for automobile design.40 Indeed, the impetus to pass the National Highway Traffic Safety Act of 1966 was probably provided
by publicity about litigation with automobile manufacturers.41
Litigation and its accompanying publicity also appears to have affected the standards set by the NHTSA. In the middle and late
1960's, around the time of the establishment of the NHTSA, a rash
of suits alleging unsafe interior design42 received a good deal of
33. See generally Hearings on S. Res.186, supra note 14, at 1409-37.
34, See, e.g., R. NADER, supra note 14, at 3-10, 45-51, 223-26; J. O'CONNELL & A.
MYERS, supra note 14, at 144, 168-88.
35. R. NADER, supra note 14, at 9-10, 21-32.
ll6. E.g., id. at l!-41.
37. Irwin, "Nominee" Nader Lashes Car Safety, Detroit News, May 22, 1966, at IOB,
col. 7 (final ed.).
l!8. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1969, at I, col. I (late city ed.).
l!9. In many cases people who are injured in automobile accidents do not consider
the manufacturer as an object of potential liability. Tort suits, with the accompanying
publicity, may alert crash victims to the possibility of lawsuits based on design defects
in their cars. See Nader&: Page, supra note 27, at 674. This phenomenon may explain
the large number of suits filed in connection with GM's Corvair. See N.Y. Times,
May 13, 1969, at 93, cols. 7-8 (late city ed.).
40. See generally Hearings on S. Res.186, supra note 14; Hearings on Motor Vehicle
Safety Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
41. See Hearings on S. Res. 186, supra note 14, at 1378; Nader &: Page, supra note
27, at 674.
42. E.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Evans v.
General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1967);
Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969).

1660

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 71:1654

publicity.43 Shortly after its inception, the NHTSA, perhaps goaded
by the public pressure aroused by this publicity, enacted a series of
regulations regarding interior safety, including, for example, standards on side door and roof strength.44 Indeed, no other area of vehicle
design is as comprehensively regulated as interior safety.
On the other hand, there have been very few suits and, consequently, little publicity regarding unsafe exterior design.46 It is,
therefore, not surprising that the NHTSA has issued only one narrow regulation on exterior design.46 In 1967, the NHTSA published
notice that it intended to formulate comprehensive standards regulating exterior design, which were to take effect on January l, 1969.47
Unfortunately, no standards were enacted in 1969, perhaps due to
pressures brought to bear by the powerful automobile industry.48
Indeed, no further regulations are planned to take effect before 1980.49
The NHTSA might be forgiven its delay in formulating comprehensive standards as to over-all vehicle geometry because of the need
for research in this area. 60 Its failure to eliminate unnecessary forceconcentrating configurations, more obviously dangerous design features, 61 is less understandable. Its failure to act has even allowed new
43. See Hearings on S. Res.186, supra note 14, at 1409-37.
44. E.g., 49 C.F.R. §§ 571.201 (Occupant Protection in Interior Impact), 571.203
(Impact Protection for the Driver from the Steering Control System), 571.204 (Steering
Control Rearward Displacement), 571.208 (Occupant Crash Protection), 571.214 (Side
Door Strength), 571.216 (Roof Crush Resistance-Passenger Cars), 571.302 (Flammability
of Interior Materials) (1972).
45. The unprotected outsider who is struck by a moving one-ton vehicle would not
be surprised to find that he has suffered an injury. However, it is rare that he would
think carefully about the exact cause of that injury. On the other hand, when a child
runs into a stationary vehicle, a severe injury is unexpected, and an attempt to discover
the precise cause of the injury is likely. Although there appear to be very few suits
against manufacturers involving pedestrians and moving vehicles, at least two unreported cases have been filed: Baker v. Thornburg, discussed in note 29 supra; Douglas
v. General Motors Corp., No. 125 738 (Super. Ct., Orange County, Cal., filed July 9, 1964)
(suit involving injury caused by Cadillac tail fin settled out of court). See Nader ~
Page, supra note 27, at 659 n.92.
46. 49 C.F.R. § 57I.2ll (1972): "Purpose and Scope. This standard precludes the use
of wheel nuts, wheel discs, and hub caps that constitute a hazard to pedestrians and
cyclists."
47. 32 Fed. Reg. 14278 (1967).
48. CoNSUMER REPORTS, supra note 9, at 182-83.
49. Letter from Lawrence R. Schneider, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Michigan Law
Review, March I, 1973.
50. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
51. See CONSUMER REPORTS, supra note 9, at 183:
[Consumer's Union] maintains that the removal of sharp edges from car exteriors
should not have to await exhaustive statistical studies of their relationship to actual
injuries. Several careful studies of accident case histories have clearly demonstrated
that sharp exterior protrusions have inflicted grievous injuries. • • • The auto
manufacturers should smooth up their cars' exteriors without waiting for computer
analysis.
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design hazards, such as pop-up headlights,52 to appear and gain
popularity. If the courts are receptive, litigation could encourage
comprehensive regulation of exterior design in much the same way
that it encouraged the establishment of standards for interior design
in the 1960's.
There is some indication that the courts are now willing to entertain exterior design litigation.53 There are three possible causes
of action under which an injured pedestrian might sue an automobile
manufacturer.54 First, a pedestrian may recover in negligence if he
proves that the manufacturer breached its duty to him by failing to
exercise reasonable care in the design of its product.55 The injured
pedestrian may also succeed in an action for breach of an implied
warranty of merchantability if he can demonstrate that the automobile was not "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used." 56 Finally, in those courts that recognize strict liability in tort, 57
the pedestrian may recover on the mere proof that his injuries were
caused by a defective exterior design. 58
All three causes of action require the plaintiff to prove that the
injury occurred during a "normal use" of the product. In negligence
terms, a manufacturer has no duty to make his product safe for unintended uses. 59 For example, an automobile manufacturer need
not make its car safe for use in circus and thrill show stunts. It
follows that when a collision is not caused by a defect in the automobile itself a plaintiff whose injuries in a collision are aggravated
by defects in the exterior design of the vehicle cannot recover from
52. See, e.g., RoAD & TRACK, March 1973, at 34 (picture of new model).
53. See, e.g., Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972), discussed in text accompanying notes 70-81 infra. Pedestrians may be endangered by exterior formations that are the result of manufacturing errors, as well as by defectively
designed formations. While it may be possible to hold the manufacturer liable for
both types of defects, this Note will focus on design defects.
54. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, ToRTS § 28.1, at 1535-36 (1956).
55. E.g., Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972). See text
accompanying notes 100-13 infra.
56. UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE § 2-314(c). See text accompanying notes II5-35 infra.
57. For a comprehensive, if slightly outdated, list of jurisdictions that recognize
strict liability in tort, see Comment, Cave Adstantem: Bystander Recovery in Products
Liability Cases, 2 CREIGHTON L. REv. 295, 324-25 (1968). Since the publication of that
compilation several states have accepted strict liability in tort. E.g., Hawkeye-Security
Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1970); Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard &
Sons, Inc., llO N.H. 36,260 A.2d lll (1969). Prosser asserts that two thirds of the states
accept strict liability in tort. W. PROSSER, TORTS§ 99, at 657-58 (4th ed. 1971).
58. E.g., Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972). See text
accompanying notes 136-43 infra.
59. See, e.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 836 (1967); Walton v. Chrysler Motor Co., 229 S.2d 568 (Miss. 1969). See generally R. HURSCH, PRODUCTS LIABILITY§ 1:5 (1961).
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the manufacturer on a negligence theory unless collisions are within
the range of the normal or intended uses of an automobile. In Evans
v. General Motors Corp., 60 a case involving a two-car collision, the
seventh circuit held that collisions, while foreseeable, are not within
the range of normal uses of the automobile. This holding has been
followed by a number of courts. 61 However, two years later, in
Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 62 the eighth circuit, perhaps inspired
by the dissent of Judge Kiley in Evans, 63 rejected the narrow view of
normal use expressed by the Evans majority. In determining that
collisions are a normal use of an automobile, the court emphasized
their foreseeability, citing statistical evidence of the frequency of
car accidents. 64 The courts at present are about equally divided
between the Larsen approach and the Evans approach, 6 1S although
the commentators overwhelmingly support Larsen. 66
The kind of split that exists among the courts in negligence
cases will also be critical in suits brought under the other two causes
of action. In order to recover for breach of implied warranty of
merchantability, a plaintiff must establish that the vehicle was not
"fit for the ordinary purposes for which [automobiles] are used"; 67
therefore, the question of normal use is also central to this cause of
60. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1967).
61. E.g., Shumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Willis
v. Chrysler Corp., 264 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967); Scheme! v. General Motors Corp.,
261 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Ind. 1966), afjd., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 945 (1968); Ford Motor Co. v. Simpson, 233 S.2d 797 (Miss. 1970).
62. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
63. 359 F.2d at 825-28.
64. 391 F.2d at 502.
65. Courts that accept the view of normal or intended use put forth in Larsen include: Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972); Ford Motor
Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1959); Grundmanis v. British Motor Corp., 308 F.
Supp. 303 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa.
1969); Badorek v. General Motors Corp., 11 Cal. App. 3d 902, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1970);
Mieher v. Brown, 3 Ill. App. 3d 802, 278 N.E.2d 869 (1972); Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C.
202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969).
For cases following the approach of the court in Evans, see cases in notes 59 and
61 supra.
66. Prosser calls the abnormal use interpretation in Evans "a specious ground." He
adds: "[An automobile collision] is, however, clearly a foreseeable danger arising out of
the intended use; and it cannot be expected that this reasoning will continue to hold."
W. PROSSER, supra note 57, § 96, at 646. See also Noel, Manufacturer's Liability for
Negligence, 33 TENN. L. REv. 444, 450-51 (1966); Note, Automobile Design Liability:
Larsen v. General Motors and its Aftermath, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 299 (1969); Casenote,
16 DE PAUL L. REv. 261 (1966); Casenote, 80 HARv. L. REv. 688 (1967); Casenote, 42
NoTRE DAME LAw. 111 (1966). But cf. Hoenig & Werber, Automobile "Crashworthiness":
An Untenable Doctrine, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 578 (1971).
67. UNIFORM CollIMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(c).
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action. 68 Finally, as comment h of section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts makes clear, a plaintiff must establish that the
product was involved in a normal use if he is to state a cause of action
in strict liability in tort. 69
The Larsen analysis of normal use has been adopted in a case
involving an outsider injured by the exterior design of a vehicle,
Passwaters v. General Motors Corp. 70 The plaintiff in that case was
a passenger on a motorcycle that collided with a 1964 Buick Skylark.
The sides of the vehicles collided, throwing the plaintiff's leg into
the wheel well of the automobile. The wheel covers on the Buick
had two blades protruding some three inches from the base of the
cover. These blades served no function other than ornamentation,71
and when the car was moving at a speed of forty miles per hour they
revolved at 568 revolutions per minute or 9.5 revolutions per
second,72 From her contact with the blades the plaintiff allegedly
received a "severe mangling type laceration to her lower calf." 73 Although the plaintiff's leg might have been injured even if the wheel
cover had been free of ornamentation, the flippers allegedly increased the severity of the injuries.
The eighth circuit, reversing a directed verdict for the defendant,
held that on these facts a cause of action had been stated by the
plaintiff in both negligence and strict liability in tort for unsafe
design.74 Although the plaintiff was a passenger on another vehicle,
the court's analysis should be equally applicable to suits brought by
pedestrian plaintiffs against manufacturers of the automobiles with
which they collide.75
68. See, e.g., Willis v. Chrysler Corp., 264 F. Supp. 1010, 1012 (S.D. Tex, 1967);
Shumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 3ll, 313 (S.D. Ohio 1967). Both cases
use Evans to conclude that collisions are not within the "ordinary purposes" of an
automobile.
69, REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment h (1965).
70. 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972).
71. 454 F.2d at 1272, The promulgation of 49 C.F.R. § 571.211 (1972), which forbids
wheel covers like those on the Buick, may have alerted Passwaters to the possibility of
a lawsuit based on defective design. Since the standard was not in effect until 1968, see
Letter from Lawrence R. Schneider, supra note 49, it was not applicable in Passwaters
because the car involved in the accident had been manufactured in the early 1960's.
72. 454 F.2d at 1272.
73. 454 F.2d at 1272.
74. 454 F.2d at 1272. There was no possibility of a count based on implied warranty
of merchantability because Iowa law was applicable to the case and the Iowa supreme
court has held that "there is no implied warranty of fitness [used by the court interchangeably with the warranty of merchantability] ••• to members of the general
public." Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., 256 Iowa 27, 33126 N.W.2d 350,354 (1964).
75. Indeed, the Passwaters analysis, in so far as it is based on foreseeability, is
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The trial court, in dismissing the negligence claim, had accepted
the manufacturer's argument that the collision between the car and
the motorcycle was an intervening cause that relieved the manufacturer from liability for injuries caused by any defective design.76
The appellate court, reversing, cited Larsen77 for the proposition
that such collisions are foreseeable and are thus a normal use of the
product:
We conclude that although the specific injury and the manner in
which it occurred may have been difficult to foresee, nevertheless
the [design] created a high risk of foreseeable harm to the general
public. The use of the highways by pedestrians, the frequency of
travel by unprotected persons riding on bicycles, motorbikes and
motorcycles is a common occurrence. We think it now settled that
a manufacturer does have the responsibility to avoid design in automobiles which can reasonably be foreseen as initially causing or aggravating serious injury to users of the highway when a collision
occurs.78

Therefore, although the collision-or, more precisely, the conduct
or conditions that caused the collision-contributed to the ultimate
injury, it did not interrupt the causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the injury because it was the sort of normal
use for which the manufacturer was to make his product safe.70
While the manufacturer was incorrect in its contention that the
collision was an intervening cause that relieved it of all liability, it
would seem unfair to hold the manufacturer liable for all the injuries received by the plaintiff as a result of the collision unless the
defect in the product caused the collision itself. Although the issue
was not discussed expressly in Passwaters, where the collision was
not caused by the defect, the plaintiff can at most allege that the defect
in exterior design caused more extensive or more serious injuries
than he would have received had the exterior of the car been propstronger in the case of pedestrians because many more pedestrians than motorcyclists
are killed in collisions each year. See text accompanying notes 2-3 supra.
76. 454 F.2d at 1272. In several cases automobile manufacturers have urged that the
cause of the first collision constituted an intervening cause that relieved the manufacturer of liability for the enhanced injuries. This argument has been rejected by
courts and commentators alike because the accident itself is foreseeable and does not,
therefore, constitute an intervening cause. Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d
1270, 1273-74 (8th Cir. 1972); Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729, 733-34 (8th Cir.
1959); Parkinson v. California, 233 F.2d 432 (10th Cir. 1956); Nader&: Page, supra note
27, at 656-59; Note, supra note 66, at 302-03.
77. 454 F.2d at 1273, citing 391 F.2d at 504.
78. 454 F.2d at 1275-76.
79. Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729, 733-34 (8th Cir. 1959), cited in 391 F.2d
at 502-03 and 454 F.2d at 1273.
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erly designed. The manufacturer should be liable only for the increase in damage that was caused by its defective design, that is, for
the enhancement of injuries that the plaintiff would otherwise have
suffered.80 This enhancement theory has already been accepted in
many "second collision" cases, which involve injuries caused by the
impact of the occupant of a vehicle with its interior, typically after
a first collision between the vehicle and another object.81 Although
Passwaters also involved two impacts, it is not a traditional "second
collision" case because both impacts were between the vehicle and
an outside object. Pedestrian cases will typically involve only one
collision, that of the pedestrian and the car.
The enhancement theory requires that the court attempt as best it
can to apportion damages among those responsible.82 Since the manufacturer is liable only for the enhancement,83 the plaintiff must look to
others, such as the driver of the car, for further compensation.84 In
Larsen, the manufacturer's argument that apportionment of damages
in enhancement cases is too difficult an issue for jury determination
was specifically rejected. 85 The court indicated that it was reluctant
to "abandon the injured party to his dismal fate as a traffic statistic"
and analogized to other difficult apportionment problems, such as
certain condemnation and comparative negligence cases.86
To guide the trier of fact in its apportionment of damages, it is
likely that the parties will offer expert evidence as to which injuries
were caused by the defect and which injuries would have occurred
even if the car had been properly designed. When the defect is a
force-concentrating object, the determination may be more easily
made than when the defect is in the geometry of the front end. There
is more information on the harmful effects of force-concentrating
80. Any design defect not causing the accident would not subject the manufacturer
to liability for the entire damage, but the manufacturer should be liable for that
portion of the damage or injury caused by the defective design over and above
the damage or injury that probably would have occurred as a result of the impact
or collision absent the defective design.
391 F.2d at 503.
81. E.g., Mickel v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969). For an extensive
discussion of second collision cases, see Katz, supra note 30; Note, supra note 7.
82. See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Badorek
v. General Motors Corp., 11 Cal. App. 3d 902, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1970).
83. 391 F.2d at 503.
84. If the driver of a car is negligent, he should be liable for all of the damage
caused by the accident, but not solely liable for the damages enhanced by the design
defect. As to the injuries attributable to the design defect, the manufacturer should
be jointly liable.
85. 391 F.2d at 503.
86. 391 F.2d at 503-04.
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objects,87 and injuries that they cause can on occasion be more
easily attributed to the design defect than can injuries caused by
over-all vehicle geometry.
In a negligence action, the manufacturer may argue that it should
not be held liable even for the enhancement of plaintiff's injuries
because plaintiff's negligence was a participating cause in his collision with the vehicle. In most jurisdictions this defense of contributory negligence will relieve the driver of the vehicle from liability
for mere negligence. 88 But plaintiff's negligence should not be a
defense for a manufacturer in an action for enhancement of injuries.
The manufacturer's affirmative defense based on the plaintiff's contributory negligence is no more persuasive than his similar claim
that the collision of the vehicle and the pedestrian constituted an
intervening cause.89 Pedestrian negligence, like collisions generally,
is clearly foreseeable 90 and is, therefore, one of the very risks against
which the manufacturer has a duty to protect. In addition, public
policy should require that the manufacturer accept the responsibility
of reducing the injuries inflicted because it is in the best position to
make the necessary design modifications.
The comments to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts reject contributory negligence as a defense to strict liability
in tort. 91 They do permit a defense of contributory fault in the form
of assumption of risk-"voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding
to encounter a known risk." 92 That is, if an injured plaintiff negligently fails to discover a defect in the product, the defendant is not
relieved of liability, but if the plaintiff discovers the defect and
knowingly encounters the risk, the manufacturer has a defense to a
cause of action based on strict liability in tort.
In actions under implied warranty of merchantability, however,
the defense of contributory negligence has occasionally been accepted.93 An examination of the facts of these cases, however, reveals
that, while the courts have labeled the plaintiffs' conduct as "con87. See text accompanying notes 18 &: 51 supra.
88. E.g., Ward v. Sun Garden Packing Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 652,332 P.2d 300 (1958);
Scott v. Sisco, 129 Ind. App. 364, 156 N.E.2d 895 (1959). See generally W. PROSSER, supra
note 57, § 65.
89. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
90. See text accompanying notes 2-4 supra.
91. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n (1965).
92. Id.
93. E.g., Dallison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1962); Nelson v.
Anderson, 245 Minn. 445, 72 N.W.2d 861 (1955). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note
57, § 102, at 670-71.
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tributory negligence," it is more accurately characterized as assumption of risk. 94 Consequently, the manufacturer can successfully assert
a contributory fault defense in either form of strict liability only if
the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily encounters the risk. 95
The assumption of risk defense, however, will not be available to
the manufacturer in the vast majority of suits brought by pedestrians.
'While a pedestrian may knowingly encounter the risk of colliding
with an automobile, in order to assume the additional risk posed by
the manufacturer's unsafe exterior design, the pedestrian must also
know of and understand this risk. As a result, the defense is not
likely to protect the manufacturer in a suit brought by one who has
neither inspected nor purchased the vehicle. Merely venturing outside one's door should not be taken as an assumption of the risk of
enhancement of injuries by dangerous exterior design.
The discussion above has focused on the causal connection
between the defect in the exterior design of the car and the enhancement of plaintiff's injuries, as well as on the related defenses
that plaintiff's own conduct contributed to his injuries. In all three
of the possible causes of action, the plaintiff must also establish the
causal relationship between the manufacturer's conduct and the defect. Ordinarily, the plaintiff must prove that the defect that enhanced his injuries existed when the product left the control of the
manufacturer. 96 In many automobile products liability cases the injury may occur some time after the car is sold, and the defect may
be in a part of the car that has been serviced-for example, the
brakes. In such cases, it may be difficult to prove that the defect was
caused by an error in manufacturing or design, rather than by the
servicer.07 However, this proof problem will seldom arise when a
pedestrian plaintiff alleges a defect in exterior design, for the original
exterior configurations of a car are seldom altered, even after extensive use of the vehicle and frequent repairs. 98 Alterations in an automobile's exterior may occasionally be made after it has left the
manufacturer's control-for example, the owner may customize his
94. See W. PROSSER, supra note 57, § 103, at 670-71.
95. See, e.g., Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970), noted
in 1 LoYOLA U. L.J. 388 (1970). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 57, § 102.
96. See Jacobson v. Ford Motor Co., 199 Kan. 64, 67, 427 P,2d 621, 624 (1967); UNI·
FORM CO!lfl\lERCIAL CODE § 2-314, Comment 13; w. PROSSER, supra note 57, § 103, at
671-72.
97. Cf. Tiffin v. A. & P. Tea Co., 18 Ill. 2d 48, 162 N.E.2d 406 (1959); Cudahy Packing
Co. v. Baskin, 170 Miss. 834, 155 S. 217 (1934).
98. Cf. Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product,
71 YALE L.J. 816,866 (1962).
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car, or the exterior may be reshaped by a collision. In such cases, in
order to hold the manufacturer liable the plaintiff must prove that
the original design, rather than the alteration, caused the enhancement of his injury. 99
In addition to the common features discussed above, each cause
of action has distinctive characteristics. In a negligence action the
pedestrian plaintiff must convince the court that the manufacturer
had a duty to design100 the automobile so that it would not be unreasonably dangerous to a pedestrian with whom it collides. In
deciding whether to impose such a duty, the court must determine,
as a question of law, whether the benefit of reducing injury to a
pedestrian outweighs the costs to the defendant and to society of
removing the danger.101 In evaluating the benefits, the court will
consider the likelihood and the possible severity of the injury.102 In
most exterior design cases, the courts can be provided with sufficient
information to make this determination.103
The courts may be reluctant to extend the scope of the manufacturer's duty to include those plaintiffs injured by exterior design
defects in collisions with stationary vehicles. Two pre-Larsen cases
held that a manufacturer owes no duty to such plaintiffs: In Hatch
v. Ford Motor Co.,104 a pointed hood ornament over nine inches
long pierced the eye of a six-year-old boy who ran into a parked
car; in Kahn v. Chrysler Corp., 105 a seven-year-old child who drove
99. If the exterior design has changed since it left the manufacturer's control as a
result of natural and predictable aging or weathering, the manufacturer may not be able
to escape liability. Cf. Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969) (plaintiff
impaled on gearshift lever during collision when plastic protective knob on end of
lever broke due to the effects of prolonged exposure to sunlight). Even though the
injury-causing condition was not present when the car was new, since the dangerous
state resulted from normal wear and tear, the product arguably left the control of the
manufacturer in a defective condition.
100. In the past, courts often held that a manufacturer does not owe a duty of due
care in the design of a product. E.g., Dillingham v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 17 F. Supp.
615 (W.D. Okla. 1936). This approach has now been wholly abandoned, and the duty to
use reasonable care in design is well recognized. See, e.g., Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown,
291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961); Carpini v. Pittsburgh &: Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404
(3d Cir. 1954); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967).
See also 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCI'S LIABILITY § 7.01(1), at 105 n.4 (1965);
Katz, supra note 30, at 864. Even those courts that have not held manufacturers to a
duty to make their cars crashworthy recognize the manufacturer's duty of due care in
designing the car, See, e.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1967).
101. See generally Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, (part 1) 28 CoLUM,
L. REv. 1014 (1928), (part 2) 29 id. 255 (1929); Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 l\f1cH. L.
REv. 1 (1953).
102. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 54, § 16.9, at 930-33.
103. See text accompanying notes 9-17 supra.
104. 163 Cal. App. 2d 393, 329 P .2d 605 (1958).
105. 221 F. Supp. 677 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
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his bicycle into the rear of a car was thrown upon the vehicle's
ornamental tail fin and suffered severe injuries. The problem of
scope of duty is usually approached in terms of foreseeability. 106
Therefore, plaintiffs who collide with moving vehicles may be included within the scope of a manufacturer's duty, while those who
collide with stationary vehicles may be excluded if it can be established that collisions between pedestrians and stationary vehicles are
far less common and thus less foreseeable than collisions between
pedestrians and moving vehicles. However, even if it is less likely
that pedestrians will collide with stationary vehicles, the possibility
does seem reasonably foreseeable. Moreover, extension of the duty
to cover those who collide with stationary vehicles would not be
unduly burdensome on the manufacturer, for it would require few
alterations beyond what is needed to make a moving vehicle safe
to pedestrians.
Once the plaintiff has successfully persuaded the court that the
automobile manufacturer owes him a duty of reasonable care in exterior design, he still has the very difficult task of proving that the
duty has been breached in that the defendant's particular design poses
an unreasonable risk of harm. This is usually a question of fact for
the jury.107 In establishing the breach the plaintiff may use evidence
of the practice of the industry108 or of a federal regulation109 or state
law.11° Evidence of a regulation or law will be persuasive.111 In
most cases the trier of fact will be called upon to use a balancing
analysis112 similar to that used in deciding if the defendant owes the
plaintiff any duty at all.113 In some cases the design feature-for
example, a spear-like hood ornament that serves only an aesthetic
purpose and is positioned where it is likely to inflict serious harmwill clearly be unreasonably dangerous. In other cases, the value of
the function that the design serves and the cost or unavailability of
alternatives may make the feature more reasonable. Metal bumper
106. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 54, § 18.2; RE-STATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 281 (1965): Noel, supra note 98, at 868-69.
107. W. PROSSER, supra note 57, § 37, at 205-08; James, Functions of Judge and Jury
in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667 (1949).
108. E.g., Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404, 407 (3d Cir. 1954).
109. E.g., 49 C.F.R. § 571.211 (1972).
110. E.g., CAL. VEHICLE CoDE § 27601 (West 1971). See Hatch v. Ford Motor Co., 163
Cal, App. 2d 393,329 P.2d 605 (1958).
Ill. See Brenner, Legal Requirements for the Equipment and Design of Private Motor
Vehicles: State Action and National Problems, 23 GEO. WASH. L. R.Ev. 429, 431 (1955).
112. See In re Texas City Disaster Litigation, 197 F.2d 771, 778 (5th Cir. 1952), affd.
sub nom. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); Schance v. H. O. Adams Tile
Co., llll Cal. App. 2d 549, 554-55, 280 P .2d 851, 855 (1955); Winsor v. Smart's Auto
Freight Co., 25 Wash. 2d !183, !188, 171 P .2d 251,254 (1941).
11!1. See text accompanying notes 101-02 supra.
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guards may be an example of a close question: While they may be
force-concentrating objects, they may also greatly reduce property
damage in many collisions by helping to prevent bumper override
and underride. In still other situations the risk to the pedestrian will
clearly be outweighed by the value of the function that the design
performs. For example, a front end that is quickly and easily displaced to the rear upon impact with a pedestrian might reduce the
risk to him but would pose a grave danger to the automobile's occupants if their vehicle struck a solid object.
The differences between the two other causes of action-strict
liability under implied warranty of merchantability and strict liability in tort-may be more theoretical than real,11 4 but each theory
does have unique requirements. Although the implied warranty of
merchantability was developed by the common law, 116 today it is
statutory law in all but one of the states in the form of section 2-314
of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). 116 Section 2-314 imposes
the warranty upon all goods sold by merchants unless the warranty
is properly excluded or modified.117 "When the breach by the seller
of subsection 2-314(2)(c), which requires that the goods be "fit for
the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used," causes per114. An action based on strict liability in tort is so similar to one based on an
implied warranty of merchantability that courts occasionally switch theories in discussing a single case or use warranty terminology to express principles of strict liability
in tort. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (Super. Ct. 1965).
The Restatement acknowledges the close relationship between the two theories of
liability. See R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment m (1965).
115. See Hoe v. Sanborn, 21 N.Y. 552 (1860); Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216
N.W. 790 (1927). The birth and growth of the warranty action is traced in Prosser, The
Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117 (1943).
116. Section 2-314 of the UCC provides:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall
be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant
with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of food
or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may
require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container
or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties may
arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
(Emphasis added.) Only Louisiana has not enacted the UCC.
117. The restrictions on modification are set out in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
2-316.
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sonal injury to the purchaser, the seller is liable for damages.118 In
an exterior design case the plaintiff must establish as a question of
fact that the particular design was not "fit" for a collision with a
pedestrian. Just as in negligence cases,119 the reasonableness of the
designs will fall along a continuum.
Even if this proof problem is met, an action based on the implied
warranty may be unavailable to a pedestrian because he is not in privity with the defendant seller. Since warranty has become enmeshed
with contract law120 a direct contractual relationship between seller
and injured party has been traditionally required.121 In common law
the requirement has been expanded to encompass users and consumers who are not in technical privity.122 A pedestrian, however,
is completely outside the distributive chain, being neither a user
nor a consumer.
In some jurisdictions the UCC may settle the question. Since
1966, it has offered three alternative provisions for section 2-318,
"Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied." 123
Alternative A, which covers only a "natural person who is in the
family or household of [the] buyer or who is a guest in his home if
it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be
118. E.g., Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 S.2d 749 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1966), afjd. as modified, 196 S.2d 115 (Fla. 1967); Newmark v. Gimbels, Inc., 54 N.J. 585,
258 A.2d 697 (1969); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314, Comment 13. See generally
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 9-6, at 286 (1972).
119. See text following note 113 supra.
120. See Comment, supra note 57, at 295.
121. See, e.g., Hanback v. Dutch Baker Boy, Inc., 107 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1939);
Nelson v. Armour Packing Co., 76 Ark. 352, 90 s:w. 288 (1905); Borucki v. McKenzie
Bros. Co., 125 Conn. 92, 3 A.2d 224 (1938). See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser,
supra note 115, at 168.
122. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960). See generally Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966).
123. Alternative A
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if
it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by
the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may
not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative B
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and
who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or
limit the operation of this section.
Alternative C
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may
reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation
of this section with respect to injury to the person of an individual to whom the
warranty extends.
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affected by the goods" and which originally stood alone, is still
in force in a majority of jurisdictions.124 Alternatives B and C, which
have been enacted in several states,125 extend the coverage of the
warranty to any third party who "may reasonably be expected to ...
be afjected by the goods."126 In jurisdictions adopting alternatives B or C, a pedestrian should be considered a third party beneficiary of the implied warranty if Larsen is followed, for the reasonable foreseeability of collisions involving third parties was established
in that case. Where alternative A is the law, the failure of the UCC
expressly to encompass reasonably foreseeable bystanders should not
foreclose the use of warranty actions by pedestrians, for the question
of the inclusion of bystanders is expressly left open by the UCC
comment.127 The courts in most jurisdictions that have enacted alternative A have gone far beyond its limited protection.128
At least two other hurdles face the pedestrian who wishes to state
a cause of action under section 2-314. First, the UCC requires that
the injured party give notice "within a reasonable time after he
discovers or should have discovered any breach,"129 and an injured
pedestrian will seldom be aware of this requirement.130 However,
because this requirement was intended for actions between merchants, courts may, on policy grounds, refuse to require that injured pedestrians give such notice.131
Second, standard limitation of damages provisions in automobile
sales contracts182 may be valid under the UCC if they meet certain
requirements of clarity and conspicuousness133 and may thus prevent
124. J. WHITE &: R. SUMMERS, supra note US, § 11-3, at 331 n.16. See generally
Comment, supra note 57, at 324-25.
125. In all, twelve states have enacted alternatives B or C or a derivative thereof.
J. WHITE &: R. SUMMERS, supra note 118, § 11-3, at 331 n.15.
•
126. Alternatives B and C differ only in that alternative C permits recovery for
commercial loss caused by a breach of warranty.
127. UNIFORM COMl\U:RCIAL CODE§ 2-318, Comment 3.
128. E.g., Toombs v. Fort Pierce Gas Co., 208 S.2d 615 (Fla. 1968); Mitchell v.
Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (Super. Ct. 1965); Piercefield v. Remington
Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965). See generally J. WHITE &: R. Sumu:RS,
supra note 118, § 10-4, at 320.
129. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 2-607(3).
130. James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAS L. REv. 44, 192, 197 (1955).
131. Support for this position is found in the comments to the UCC, which state:
"[I]he rule requiring notification is designed to defeat commercial bad faith, not to
deprive a good faith consumer of his remedy." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607,
Comment 4. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 57, § 97, at 655-56.
132. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), for
an example of a standard auto manufacturer's warranty.
133. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316.
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the plaintiff from receiving full compensation. The courts, however,

have treated these provisions unfavorably in personal injury cases,
occasionally refusing to enforce the clause on policy grounds even
when the plaintiff purchased the product.134 It makes even less sense
to allow such disclaimers to foreclose recovery by a pedestrian, for
he has no knowledge of the contract clause, did not sign it, and has
had no opportunity to inspect the product.
In order to extend the protection of the implied warranty beyond
the buyer to third parties who did not sign the contract, courts have
stretched the contract concepts underlying the warranty beyond
recognition.136 Consequently, the conceptually more precise cause of
action of strict liability in tort has proved more appealing to many
courts and may be more appropriate in a case brought by a pedestrian.136 It has been formulated in section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. 131 Section 402A provides, in part, that the seller
of "any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer" is liable for physical harm to his person
or property. Although section 402A abolishes the technical privity
requirement, it still speaks in terms of the "user or consumer."
However, a pedestrian may not be foreclosed by this language, for
in approving section 402A, the American Law Institute, like the
commentators to the UCC, took a neutral position on the issue of
bystander recovery.138 In fact, the Restatement's comments admit
that its failure to protect bystanders expressly may be due to the fact
that the social pressure responsible for the development of strict
liability in tort has been generated by consumers, rather than by
bystanders. 139 Since the ratification of the Restatement, the trend
among both courts140 and commentators141 has been to extend strict
liability in tort to bystanders.
134. E.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Sup. Ct. 1969). See generally DeChaine, Products Liability and the Disclaimer, 4 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 364
(1967); Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in DefectiveProducts Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974 (1966); Prosser, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, supra note 121.
135. For a list of examples, see Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE.
L. REv. 119, 153-55 (1958).
136. Strict liability in tort has been accepted by two thirds of the states. W. PROSSER,
supra note 57, § 99, at 657-58.
137. For an alternative formulation, see Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc.,
59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). See also Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P .2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
138. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, caveat 1. See also id., comment o.
139. Id., comment o.
140. See, e.g., Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972);
Wasik v. Ford Motor Co., 423 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1970); Caruth v. Mariani, 11 Ariz. App.
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In addition to convincing the court that strict liability in tort
should cover nonusers, the pedestrian who sues under this theory
must ordinarily establish that the exterior design of the automobile
was in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous to" 142 pedestrians. In determining that such a condition has been established,
the trier of fact is again called upon to strike a balance between the
pedestrian's safety and the benefits that proceed from the design
feature. 143 As pedestrians and cyclists who are injured in collisions with
automobiles become aware that, to a significant extent, their injuries may be due to defective exterior design, there will be more
cases like Passwaters. An increase in this type of litigation may stimulate comprehensive federal regulation of exterior design, just as
Larsen and similar cases inspired comprehensive safety regulation
of interior design. If the NHTSA does take action on exterior design
problems, it must balance the pedestrian's interests against competing considerations, such as the financial cost of introducing safe
designs, the minimization of damage in collisions between cars, and
the safety of automobile occupants. While this balance is similar to
188, 463 P.2d 83 (1970); Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d
84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969); Mieher v. Brown, 3 Ill. App. 3d 802, 278 N.E.2d 869
(1972); Lamendola v. Mizell, 115 N.J. Super. 514, 280 A.2d 241 (1971); Darryl v. Ford
Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969). Cf. Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp.
776 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965);
Ford Motor Co. v. Cockrell, 211 S.2d 833 (Miss. 1968).
141. See, e.g., Noel, Products Liability: Bystanders, Contributory Fault and Unusual
Uses, 50 F.R.D. 321 (1970); Noel, Defective Products: Extension of Strict Liability to
Bystanders, 38 TENN. L. REv. 1 (1970); Comment, supra note 57; Comment, Strict
Liability in Tort Based on Defective Design, 1970 WASH. U. L.Q. 359; Comment,
Products Liability-Innocent Bystander's Right to Recover, 9 WASHBURN L.J. 483 (1970);
Casenote, 19 AM. U. L. REv. 263 (1970); Casenote, 23 U. MIAMI L. REv. 266 (1968).
142. In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433 (1972), the California supreme court rejected the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement that is set out in the Restatement. The court reasoned that such language
made the strict liability in tort action too much like an action in negligence, Although
previous California courts had cited section 402A of the Restatement approvingly, the
court chose to rely upon the first judicial formulation of the action for strict liability
in tort, one that did not contain the "unreasonably dangerous" language. Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
Shortly after the decision in Cronin, a New Jersey lower court followed suit and abrogated the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement for strict liability in tort. Glass v.
Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (1973).
Under these decisions any "defective" product that causes physical harm will result
~n liability on the part of the seller. It seems likely, however, that the same balancing
tests applied to determine if a design was unreasonably dangerous will now be applied
to determine if the design is "defective." Thus, although the "unreasonably dangerous"
language is gone the balancing test will probably remain.
143. Cf. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS-§ 402A, comment i. See also text accompanying notes 101-02 supra.
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that which must be struck by various courts in suits against the
manufacturer, the uniform elimination of certain dangerous exterior
designs pursuant to federal regulations would be much more effective in bringing about design changes and would require less human
suffering than merely holding the manufacturer liable for damages
after each serious injury that these designs cause.

